SAS farce shows how hard it is to help the faltering Libyan rebels - WalesOnline

In this exclusive article, military and foreign policy expert Professor Paul Moorcraft gives his verdict on the botched SAS operation and the high price we'll pay for peace in the Middle East and North Africa

SOMETIMES revolutions fail. The rebels in Libya may be too disorganised to resist the relatively more disciplined but certainly better armed and co-ordinated forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi. That might explain the SAS fiasco this week.

No-one should blame the SAS – despite the defence cuts, they are still the best soldiers in the world. They were doing what their political masters told them to do. Any official diplomatic mission could have landed with one of the two Royal Navy ships which had docked at the rebel-held port of Benghazi, but this would have been an open secret. The SAS intervention was clearly a covert mission.

The best explanation for arrival by helicopter of eight men dressed in black in the middle of the night, or so we are told by the media, was to meet up with key military rebels to help organise their resistance. The arms, maps and explosives do not suggest a diplomatic mission to "find a suitable hotel" or gauge the need for humanitarian requirements. The team, it was reported, also carried a variety of passports. This indicates again the covert role of the SAS team and their MI6 companion. It would have allowed the men to operate secretly and claim to be other than Britons, should things go seriously wrong. In the jargon, this would permit their "deniability" – they are nothing to do with us, guv.

Other SAS troops had been operating inside the country, helping to organise and protect the rescue missions of expats from the desert locations. Also, Dutch Marines, possibly special forces, had already been arrested elsewhere in Libya.

Nato has been busy with a variety of military plans, even though officially the alliance is wary of no-fly zones. Washington is not keen, because US forces now in the Mediterranean would have to "suppress" air defences, which could entail heavy bombing.

This kind of sabre-rattling, as with the botched SAS intervention, plays into the hands of Gaddafi, who is only too eager to blame the faltering Libyan revolution on foreigners, whether al-Qaeda or "US-Zionist imperialists". Not surprisingly, the Arab League and the African Union are incapable of joint action, nor can they even finesse a proper rescue operation for the tens of thousands of their nationals seeking refuge in Tunisia – that is largely left to Western taxpayers or the UN.

I would suggest that much secret support – including from the US – has already gone to the rebels. It is strange how in a police state so many rebels suddenly appeared with shiny new anti-Gaddafi flags. Presumably, they had been shipped in earlier.

Nevertheless, the sheer lack of organisation, especially a military professional core, could scuttle the revolution, unless more external aid is given, including more next- door assistance, for example by Egyptian special forces.

Gaddafi is not going to give up. He may even be prepared to use his alleged stocks of mustard gas, though he would have problems "weaponising" them – that is, fitting them into projectiles. He will step up the use of his war planes and helicopter gunships. The country could be permanently split if the tribes are fully mobilised, though this seems not yet a factor outside the current pro-Gaddafi strongholds.

Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, intervention by the regular army is unlikely. It has been deliberately weakened and divided by a paranoid Gaddafi to prevent such a threat. It is possible that some of the regular military and military intelligence units could defect if Tripoli looked like falling. But don't bank on large-scale defection of the remaining organised units.

Because the UN has said Gaddafi and his henchmen are likely to face the International Criminal Court, this means no exit, not just for Gaddafi but for his military and intelligence. Paradoxically, the ICC action has ensured a fight to the death.

To avoid the defeat of the revolution or a stalemate civil war lasting months or even years, external intervention of some sort is required. Sanctions and seizing of overseas assets will also take months or years to take full effect.

In short, when William Hague gave the final nod to the SAS, after consulting with his Cabinet colleagues, he was doing the right thing: providing the beginning of a proper military structure to the rebels. The coalition government, after a long period of criticism, was taking bold action. They had also been bold about earlier special forces' action, but couldn't say so.

William Hague, under embarrassing interrogation in Parliament yesterday, stuck to the "diplomatic mission" line. If true, he is a fool. Instead, he was compelled to maintain SAS and national security.

Unfortunately, the latest operation – and the humiliation for the SAS of having their personalised weapons confiscated – was botched by poor communication. The FCO/MI6 had failed to tell the right people the men in black were on their way. That may be more a comment on the chaos in Benghazi, however, than Whitehall incompetence.

The revolutions sweeping the Arab world will be accelerated or stalled, depending on the fate of Gaddafi.

The mad tyrant must go, but he could herald the victory of Islamists in many countries. If Saudi Arabia starts to topple, expect to pay more than double the current petrol prices.

But the West and its oil-hungry voters backed the tyrants. Their departure and the possibility of secular democracy will demand a high price, and not just in the Middle East.

Professor Paul Moorcraft, the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, has worked extensively in the Middle East and in the UK MoD