Time to clean up US regime-change programs in Cuba - MiamiHerald.com

As USAID subcontractor Alan P. Gross marked his second year in a Cuban prison for carrying out secret "democracy promotion" operations, White House spokesman Jay Carney demanded his immediate release and gloated: "Cuban authorities have failed in their effort to use Gross as a pawn for their own ends." The message is simple: Gross is our pawn, not the Cubans'.

The administration's signals throughout the Gross affair have been clear. To Havana, it's been "no negotiation." To Gross, "tough luck." And to Americans who think our 50-year Cuba policy should be reviewed, it is, "Don't hold your breath."

When a covert action run by the CIA goes bad and a clandestine officer gets arrested, the U.S. government works up a strategy for negotiating his release. When a covert operator working for USAID gets arrested, Washington turns up the rhetoric, throws more money at the compromised program, and refuses to talk.

For three years, I was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's lead investigator into the political operations of the State Department and USAID in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. The Cuba programs — designed to identify, organize, train and mobilize Cubans to demand political change — have an especially problematic heritage, including embezzlement, mismanagement, and systemic politicization. Some program successes costing millions of taxpayer dollars, such as the creation of a network of "independent libraries," were grossly exaggerated or fabricated.

An oversight committee's mandate is to ensure that funds — about $20 million a year but surging to $45 million in 2009 — are used effectively and in a manner consistent with U.S. law. State and USAID fought us at every turn, refusing to divulge even basic information about the programs, citing only a document of vague "program objectives."

The programs did not involve our Intelligence Community, but the secrecy surrounding them, the clandestine tradecraft (including the use of advanced encryption technologies) and the deliberate concealment of the U.S. hand, had all the markings of an intelligence covert operation. We never requested the names of their on-island operatives, but program managers claimed that "people will die" if we knew the names of even U.S.-based "partner" groups.

The programs were not a secret in Cuba. The Cuban government had them deeply penetrated. We did not know who Alan P. Gross was — indeed, the State Department vehemently denied he was theirs after his arrest, and even some of our diplomats in Havana thought he was working for CIA. But it was clear that the Cubans had been on him. Cuban television has shown video of other contractors in action on the island.

Only Gross can say what he knew about Cuban law as he carried out his $585,000 contract, including five visits to Cuba. He has said that he was "duped." We confirmed that State and USAID had no policy in place to brief individuals conducting these secret operations that they are not legal in Cuba, nor that U.S. law does not allow unregistered foreign agents to travel around the country providing satellite gear, wide-area WiFi hotspots, encryption and telephony equipment and other cash-value assistance.